Politicizing Dasein:
Marcuse's Engagement with Heidegger

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Abstract:
This paper aims to elucidate, in some systematic degree, Herbert Marcuse's engagement with Martin Heidegger. I will argue that Marcuse's engagement with Heidegger is geared toward the realization of the radical subject as the agent of social transformation, an attempt which preoccupied Marcuse throughout most of his life. This is because Marcuse at first finds Heidegger's existential phenomenology as promising. He sees hope in Heidegger's emphasis on "concrete philosophy" which aims at the emancipation of the "dehumanized" individuals in contemporary society. However, Marcuse soon realizes that Heidegger's Dasein is not an active subject and therefore cannot be disposed to radical political action. For Marcuse, Heidegger's Dasein is a solitary subject, that is, an asocial and apolitical subject who is detached from concrete socio-historical realities. Inasmuch as social transformation for Marcuse can be attained through a collective radical political action, it seems he is alluding to the fact that Heidegger's existential phenomenology would make sense if Dasein is politicized. In order to fully appreciate Marcuse's overall project and the reason why he was attracted to Heidegger's philosophy, the discussion that follows starts with a brief historical background on Marcuse's career and the socio-economic and political condition of Germany before the Heidegger encounter, and then proceeds to Marcuse's engagement with Heidegger.

Keywords:
Marcuse, Heidegger, political Dasein, Frankfurt School, critical theory

Marcuse observed that after the First World War and the German Revolution of 1918-1919, Germany was experiencing a deep economic, political, and cultural crisis. Marcuse returned to Berlin at the age of 24 after completing his doctorate from the University of Freiburg in 1922. In Berlin, he continued his systematic study of Marx, which according to Douglas Kellner had started around 1918.[1] Marcuse was attracted to Marx's vehement critique of capitalism and the idea of socialist revolution as the best means to address such crisis. However, the rise of Soviet Marxism (and Stalinism) had made Marcuse ambivalent toward some of the basic tenets of orthodox Marxism. He became dissatisfied with many aspects of orthodox Marxism at this time which gradually became Stalinism. In 1958, he went back to it and recast his ambivalence toward Soviet Marxism. In *Soviet Marxism: A Critical Analysis*, Marcuse writes: "...the fundamental ambivalence in Soviet development consists in the fact that the means for liberation and humanization operate for preserving domination and submission, and the theory that destroyed all ideology is used for the establishment of a new ideology."[2] As a result, Marcuse attempted to revitalize Marxism by looking for a corrective to this flaw elsewhere.

Marcuse initially dealt with this program of revitalization of Marxism by reading György Lukács's *History and Class Consciousness* published in 1923. Marcuse, like many of his contemporaries, was struck by Lukács's analysis, especially his theory of reification. As is well known, Lukács's *History and Class Consciousness* was to play a major influence to several generations of critical theorists. This was echoed recently by Axel Honneth, in his Tanner Lectures delivered at the University of California at Berkeley in 2005, in which he reminds us of the deep impact Lukács had on the philosophers and sociologists in the German-speaking world of the 1930s and indeed in many years later. Commenting on Lukács's *History and Class Consciousness*, Honneth writes: "This work moved an entire generation of philosophers and sociologists to analyze the forms of life under the then-prevailing circumstances as being the result of social reification."[3]

But Marcuse had a problem with the basic assumption in Lukács that it is only the "correct practical class consciousness of the proletariat" that can address the problem of reification.[4] For Marcuse, Lukács's notion of "correct class consciousness" is dangerous

[1] See Douglas Kellner, *Herbert Marcuse and the Crisis of Marxism* (Hampshire and London: Macmillan, 1984), 199.

[2] Herbert Marcuse, *Soviet Marxism: A Critical Analysis* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1958), xiv. See also Kellner, *Marcuse and the Crisis of Marxism*, 200.

[3] Axel Honneth, *Reification: A New Look at an Old Idea*, with Commentaries by Judith Butler, Raymond Geuss, & Jonathan Lear, edited and introduced by Martin Jay (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 17.

[4] György Lukács, *History and Class Consciousness*: Studies in Marxist Dialectics, trans. by Rodney Livingstone (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1968), 205. For a more recent literature on Lukács's view on history and class consciousness, see Ferenc L. Lendvai, "György Lukács 1902-1918:

since this gives room for the vanguardist position of Vladimir I. Lenin, for whom the workers must have a social democratic consciousness among themselves that must be brought to them from the outside, namely, from the educated members of the Socialist Party.[5] Most importantly, according to Morton Schoolman, Marcuse saw that Lukács's notion of "correct class consciousness" as the only means to address reification is flawed because those who "have not achieved this level of political and theoretical knowledge, who do not understand the social system from the class standpoint" are not inclined to radical action.[6] Alluding to what Marx had argued in the *Critique of the Gotha Program* that the "dictatorship of the proletariat," as a political condition, can only be resorted to if there are no other ways to reach socialism as the first stage of communism,[7] Marcuse argues that it is not the proletariat as construed along the Marxist-Leninist line, but rather the "concrete individual," beyond the individual defined through class affiliation, who can be the agent of a genuine social transformation. Marcuse by this time had already approached the problem of the possibility of radical action from the perspective of concrete individual rather than the proletariat dissolved in party organization. This is precisely the shift of perspective that Marcuse found in Heidegger.

Marcuse read Heidegger's *Being and Time* in 1927, the year of its publication. According to Peter Lind, Marcuse was attracted by the questioning quality of Heidegger's thought and the latter's attempt to put philosophy on concrete foundations by a radical application of Husserl's phenomenological program of "going back to things themselves."[8] Marcuse found in Heidegger's method a form of "concrete philosophy," that is, a philosophical way of answering the task that he had set himself: the redemption of the concrete individual from social control and domination. As we can see in the discussion that follows, Marcuse's engagement with Heidegger centers on the analysis of the concrete

His Way to Marx", *Studies in East European Thought*, Vol. 60 No. 1/2, The Sociological Tradition of Hungarian Philosophy (June 2008), 55-73 and Slavoj Zizek, "From History of Class Consciousness to the Dialectic of Enlightenment...and Back", *New German Critique*, No. 18 (Autumn, 2000), 107-123. In "From History of Class Consciousness to the Dialectic of Enlightenment...and Back", Zizek highlights the point that Lukács, at least during the early period of his career, considers the proletariat as the "subject-object" of history and, thus, it is their awareness that they are the potent agent of radical social change that they are able to countervail reification. See ibid., 109.

[5] Vladimir I. Lenin, *Marx, Engels, Marxism* (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1970), 138-139.

[6] Morton Schoolman, *The Imaginary Witness: The Critical Theory of Herbert Marcuse* (New York: The Free Press, 1980), 9.

[7] Karl Marx, *Critique of the Gotha Program*, in *Marx and Engels: Basic Writings on Politics and Philosophy*, ed. Lewis S. Feuer (New York: Collins, 1959), 169. For an excellent discussion on Marx's case for participatory democracy, see Patricia Springborg, "Karl Marx on Democracy, Participation, Voting, and Equality", *Political Theory*, Vol. 12 No. 4 (November 1984), 537-556.

[8] Peter Lind, *Marcuse and Freedom* (London and Sydney: Croom Helm, 1985),

individual (Dasein) and the notion of historicity. He sees in Heidegger the attempt to restore the individual's concrete existence to the center of philosophy. In an interview with Frederick Olafson in 1977, Marcuse reminisced about those early years: "We saw in Heidegger what we had first seen in Husserl, a new beginning, the first radical attempt to put philosophy on really concrete foundations-philosophy concerned with the human existence, the human condition, and not merely with abstract ideas and principles."[9] This is indeed what interests Marcuse in *Being and Time.*

However, it must be noted that Marcuse's engagement with Heidegger does not amount to a break with Marx. Rather, Marcuse's reading of Heidegger's *Being and Time* led to a re-appropriation and a more heightened understanding of Marx. Lind observes that "during the period 1929 to 1933, Marcuse was vividly interested and concerned with the idea of promoting a better understanding of Marx, radically different from that of mainstream Marxism...."[10] This is precisely the reason why Marcuse turned to Heidegger rather than Lukács in his attempt to correct orthodox Marxism, for what concerns Marcuse henceforth "which became the cornerstone of his thoughts throughout his life...was the emphasis on the concrete, universal individual as the subject of social and historical transformation."[11] Thus, in 1929, two years after he read Heidegger's *Being and Time*, Marcuse decided to return to the University of Freiburg to study under Heidegger himself.

We now need to see how Marcuse found in the early Heidegger a philosophical path for addressing both social pathologies and the problem regarding the agent(s) of social transformation. In order to do this, we must briefly sketch Heidegger's argument in *Being and Time.* This is necessary because it is the trajectory of Heidegger's project in *Being and Time* that allows us to fully understand how Marcuse started to articulate the notion of a concrete individual.

In *Being and Time*, Heidegger had undertaken to analyze the dynamics and structure of Being through the use of phenomenological ontology.[12] On the one hand, ontology for

[9] Frederick Olafson, "Heidegger's Politics (1977), An Interview with Herbert Marcuse", in *The Essential Marcuse. Selected Writings of Philosopher and Social Critic Herbert Marcuse*, eds. Andrew Feenberg and William Leiss (Boston: Beacon Press, 2007), 116.

[10] Ibid., 19.

[11] John Abromeit, "Herbert Marcuse's Critical Encounter with Martin Heidegger 1927-1933", in *Herbert Marcuse: A Critical Reader*, eds. John Abromeit and W. Mark Cobb (New York and London: Routledge, 2004), 132.

[12] Richard Sembera describes Heidegger's approach as hermeneutic phenomenology, a type of phenomenology that does not only seek adequate description of things but as the basis for further interpretation. See Richard Sembera, *Rephrasing Heidegger: A Companion to Being and Time* (Ottawa: The University of Ottawa Press, 2007), xvi. Moreover, Sembera interprets hermeneutic phenomenology as Heidegger's fundamental ontology. See Ibid., 33, 59. Sembera's *Rephrasing Heidegger* is a recent retranslation, reordering, and reinterpretation of Heidegger's *Being and Time* in English and is well known to have clarified the ambiguities left by the two earlier translations of *Being and Time*, that is, by John Macquarie and Edward Robinson in 1962 and Joan Stambaugh in 1996. As a famous Heidegger scholar, Sembera is able to present excellently Heidegger's difficult terminologies and

Heidegger means the theoretical inquiry that is explicitly devoted to the Being of entities, i.e., their meaning, their modifications and derivations.[13] On the other, and contrary to Husserl's view, phenomenology for Heidegger means engaging oneself with the world and at the same time attuning itself to what this world reveals.[14] Thus, the Heideggerian notion of phenomenology should not be understood in the literal sense, that is, as *phainomenon* and *logos*, which literally means "study of things shown"[15] or, for Sembera, the act of giving an account on appearances.[16] It must be viewed also as the unconcealment of Being and the appropriation of that which is unconcealed. Heidegger's concept of phenomenology is crucial to his concept of ontology because for Heidegger, it is only through phenomenology that one "can have access to what is to be the theme of ontology...."[17] Heidegger says explicitly that "only as phenomenology, is ontology possible."[18] Then Heidegger assigns "human being" or Dasein, meaning being-there, as the "subject" of his phenomenological ontology. Heidegger writes: "We are ourselves the entities to be analyzed. The Being of any such entity is in each case mine."[19] Inasmuch as ontology is possible only as phenomenology and it is human beings who are the "subject" of this inquiry, Heidegger concludes that ontology is possible only as phenomenology of human existence. Heidegger thus famously addresses Dasein as the Being who can answer the question concerning the Being of entities. This methodological move is crucial to Marcuse because it demonstrates how concrete existence can form the ground for the deepest kind of philosophical inquiry, and conversely, how the inquiry of the most abstract kind (ontology) can speak meaningfully about everyday existence.

If Dasein is being-there, then the question is: where and how does it come to be there? The result of Heidegger's existential phenomenology as an inquiry into the Being of beings is that Dasein is being-there-in-the-world and that it has come to be in the

manner of expression in clear and simple terms without sacrificing quality and distorting the original thought of Heidegger. That is why I will use him as the main reference in this section.

[13] Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. by John Macquarie and Edward Robinson (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1978), 32. For a further discussion on Heidegger's fundamental ontology, see also Michael Bowler, *Heidegger and Aristotle. Philosophy as Praxis* (New York: Continuum International Publishing Group, 2008), 92-115 and Sembera, Rephrasing Heidegger, 1-7, 13-20.

[14] See Bowler, *Heidegger and Aristotle*, 96. Roughly speaking, in Husserl's conception of phenomenology, the world itself seems to be grasped by standing outside of it, that is, by just perceiving or conceptualizing it from a distance. See Ibid., 97. Heidegger insists that the world is not just to be intended, but also the world itself is to be lived, to be engaged with. It is from where things are given to people. See Ibid., 98. See also Martin Heidegger, *Towards the Definition of Phiosophy*, trans. by Ted Sadler (London and New Brunswick, NJ: The Athlone Press, 2000), 92-99.

[15] David Macey, *Dictionary of Critical Theory* (London: Penguin Books, 2001), 297.

[16] Sembera, *Rephrasing Heidegger*, 1. In *Being and Time*, Heidegger's discussion on phenomenology is rather complicated. For an excellent discussion on Heidegger's concept of phenomenology, see Ibid., 53-62.

[17] Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 60. See also Heidegger, *Definition of Philosophy*, 106-109.

[18] Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 60.

[19] Ibid., 67.

world through "deliverance." Heidegger writes:

"This characteristic of Dasein's Being this 'that it is it is veiled in its 'whence' and 'whither', yet disclosed in itself all the more unveiledly; we call it the *'thrownness'* of this entity into its 'there'; indeed, it is thrown in such a way that, as Being-in-the-world, it is the 'there'. The expression 'thrownness' is meant to suggest the *facticity of its being delivered over.*"[20]

This means that for Heidegger, every existence is a "thrownness" which implies that Dasein always exists with other entities in the world. As a being-with-others-in-the-world, Dasein is entirely submerged in the immediate concern of the everyday world into which it is thrown, notably in terms of the objects that are deemed worthy of concern.

Heidegger also expresses this idea that Dasein is submerged in the immediate concern of the everyday world into which it is thrown, by saying Dasein is constantly related to other entities in the form of care. The term "care" for Heidegger does not suggest sensibility as when one is in a state of "worry" or anxious involvement. "*Care* is simply a term referring to the structural whole constituted by being-self-ahead, being-already, and being-among."[21] Thus, care is understood as Dasein's act of expressing anything about itself to itself.[22] It is not to be understood as an ethical category, that is, an "ought" on the part of Dasein to care for others. It is rather an ontological category which is necessary for Dasein to become aware of its very own existence and which describes the core structure of that existence, notably in its temporal dimensions. In particular, care as care for one's self, faces Dasein to project its own possibility and thereby to define its own existence. Yet Dasein, as "thrown," is initially tied to things in the world, and extracts from the environment the social and material content of its own possibilities. This is where the fundamental concept of inauthenticity appears. According to Heidegger, Dasein's everyday being-with-one-another in the world stands in subjection precisely because it is thrown in a world in which at first the core "concerns" have been imposed on it. In other words its Being is taken away from itself.[23] Having been "delivered over," Dasein has fallen into the "world." Dasein is inauthentic at first because its very own existence has succumbed to the path prescribed for it by the world. As Heidegger writes: "Fallenness into the world means an absorption in Being-with-one-another.... Through the Interpretation of falling...we have (now what we) called the inauthenticity of Dasein...."[24]

[20] Heidegger,*Being and Time*, 74. For Heidegger's hermeneutics of facticity, see Sembera, *Rephrasing Heidegger*, 20-28.

[21] Sembera, *Rephrasing Heidegger*, 121. Italics mine.

[22] Heidegger,*Being and Time*, 227.

[23] Ibid., 164.

[24] Ibid., 220.Emphasis added. Note that it is in the interconnectedness of crosstalk, curiosity, ambiguity, and turmoil that "fallenness" is revealed. However, they are not necessary in this discussion. What we areconcerned here is the logic behind Heidegger's existential phenomenology and its transition to Marcuse's notion of historicity. Nonetheless, skipping the discussion on these terms would not alter the logic of the whole inquiry. For a substantive discussion on Heidegger's notion of the "fallenness" ofDasein, see Sembera, *Rephrasing Heidegger*, 100-108.

This notion of fallenness is important to Marcuse as it provides the crucial link to his critical social theory. Heidegger's concept of "fallenness" as the surrender of Dasein's creative abilities to worldly things is reinterpreted by Marcuse as "reification," that is to say, the submission of the individual to the "organized, rationalized, alien affairs of capitalism."[25] In other words, Marcuse interprets through a materialist lens the idea of "fallenness" which Heidegger had first articulated to open up the realm of ontology.

Heidegger believes that Dasein is not aware of this inconspicuous fallenness, of Dasein's "flight from itself toward the world," because it is a necessary condition of being-in-the-world. Sembera writes: "At the everyday level, there is no conscious awareness that Dasein is fleeing itself. Rather, it is an essential feature of turmoil (*der Wirbel*) and downfall or falling (*Verfallen*) of Dasein that average everydayness is simply characterized by a vague sense of unrest or unease. It is a characteristic feature of turmoil that the awareness of the true reason for the fall to the world is *suppressed*."[26] If Dasein is to be authentic, therefore, it has to gain somehow full awareness of the significance of what it means "to be," of what it means to be a self with others and objects in the world.[27]

If inauthenticity is understood as the fallenness of Dasein into the "world," and if authenticity means full awareness of what it means to be a self with others and objects in the world, then this implies a "becoming" or the realization of Dasein's possibilities. For Heidegger, such realization of Dasein's possibilities occurs through the experience of angst which mobilizes other key categories, such as, death, conscience, and decidedness. Heidegger understands angst as the authentic sensibility that discloses Dasein's finite existence in the world.[28] This disclosure allows Dasein to understand itself as a finite being thrown toward its own-most possibility, which is death. Through death, understood as the paradoxical possibility of no-longer-being-able-to-be-there, Dasein is thrown back onto its own resources. This movement then discloses Dasein as an individual self thrown into the world, whose task in the world is to exist as itself, that is to say, to be authentic.[29] For Heidegger, therefore, death is the ultimate basis of authenticity.

The categories of conscience and decidedness answer the question concerning the possibility of authentic existence. Conscience is the inner voice within Dasein itself that calls Dasein to "come back to itself and seize the authentic possibility of truly being itself."[30] Conscience appears to be an "ought" on the part of Dasein to own his existence again. Once Dasein heeds the call of conscience, decidedness ensues. Authenticity, therefore, as the full awareness of the significance of what it means to be a self also means

[25] Schoolman, *Imaginary Witness*, 7.

[26] Sembera, *Rephrasing Heidegger*, 110. German words supplied.

[27] Barry Katz, *Herbert Marcuse and the Art of Liberation: An Intellectual Biography* (London: Verso, 1982), 68.

[28] Sembera, *Rephrasing Heidegger*, 157.

[29] Ibid., 162.

[30] Ibid., 163.

an "awareness of one's own-most possibilities and the firm resolve to realize them in the future."[31] Authenticity is thus tied to one's possibilities and to possible future ways of being. This makes manifest the "temporal" axis of existential phenomenology-Dasein is in the present, indebted to the past, and oriented toward the future (death).[32] The threefold structure of care turns out to be also the structure of existence: the human being is a being in time.

Now, this fundamental lesson from Heidegger's existential phenomenology that "to be" is "to be in time" translates directly into a key argument of great importance for social philosophy, because of the way in which Heidegger also shows that "to be in time" is precisely "to be historical". As Barry Katz puts it, "Historicity is the pivotal concept in Heidegger's ontology, which refers to the way in which individuals proceed to self-awareness of the way they live in history."[33] He adds: "It comprehends the way in which individuals relate to their own past and appropriate the tradition of which they are a part."[34] Or, to quote another commentator, according to Alfred Schmidt, historicity is the hidden ground of Heidegger's *Being and Time* as it provides the key to understanding the way in which Dasein proceeds to grapple with its possibilities.[35]

It is precisely at this point that the young Marcuse saw the connection between his interests in politics and history and Heidegger's fundamental ontology and existential phenomenology. For Marcuse, historicity as the individual's awareness of his being historical clarifies the question concerning the way we address the challenges to the present as well as the way we face history. Historicity explains how Dasein as a temporal being becomes determined to project its own possibilities by appropriating what had been provided for itself in the world, that is, the material content of its existence. Following Heidegger, Marcuse argues that it is through the historicity of Dasein that Dasein as a thrown being is able to create its form of existence from the past, to modify this existence according to its own wish, and to project the possibility of authentic existence in the future.[36]

Marcuse reads into Heidegger's philosophical deduction the possibility of radical

[31] Abromeit, *Marcuse's Critical Encounter*, 135.

[32] Katz, *Herbert Marcuse*, 69. See also Douglas Kellner, *Heidegger's Concept of Authenticity* (Ann Arbor, Michigan: University Microfilms, 1973). This material is Kellner's PhD dissertation at Columbia University which was produced from a microfilm copy of the original.

[33] Ibid., 70. See also Sembera, *Rephrasing Heidegger*, 188-220.

[34] Katz, *Herbert Marcuse*, 70. See also Sembera, *Rephrasing Heidegger*, 212. According to Sembera, Heidegger's notion of historicity is "nothing other than the structure of Dasein making it possible for the past to form a continuous whole with the present and the future.

[35] Alfred Schmidt, "Existential Ontology and Historical Materialism in the Work of Herbert Marcuse", translated by Anne-Marie and Andrew Feenberg, in *Marcuse: Critical Theory and the Promise of Utopia*, eds. Robert Pippin, Andrew Feenberg, Charles P. Webel, and Contributors (Massachusetts: Bergin and Garvey Publishers, 1988), 57.

[36] Ibid., 62.

action. The analysis of Dasein explains the question of what it means to be historical. For Marcuse, this is the most important question because, as already pointed out above, an awareness of the way we live in history is the precondition of radical action. And for Marcuse, "radical action" is deeply rooted in Dasein's existence and is the hidden disposition of every individual to change and reshape the world he is thrown into. It is clear that Marcuse socializes and politicizes Heidegger's Dasein.[37] In his readings of Marcuse's "Contribution to a Phenomenology of Historical Materialism," Morton Schoolman claims that Marcuse makes public that which lies private in Heidegger's notion of care, that in this notion there lies an as yet unarticulated desire to create a space for the unnamed but no less real human potentialities, and that within the deeper dimension of human existence there lies the secret ambition to change the world.[38] Marcuse uses Heidegger's analytic of everyday Dasein to develop a concept of how every individual can realize its own historicity, that is to say, be self-conscious and respond to the challenges of the time. For Marcuse, Heidegger helps to show how the struggle against domination rests on the concrete individual and begins from him.

However, despite the great benefit drawn from *Being and Time*, there is a serious flaw in his approach. One might read Heidegger's historical Dasein as being in fact a powerless subject of history. For Heidegger, according to Werner Marx, Dasein must surely be thought of historically but in such a way that any given change would not depend upon the power of man, even though a certain role in the occurrence seems to be due to him.[39] Moreover, Heidegger claims that authentic existence can be attained through the "practical" concern for one's own existence. But read in a certain way, this might be taken to mean: "and not the existence of others." In other words, the solution to the problem of inauthenticity for Heidegger is based on solitary existence leading to self-realization.

[37] This is also true to Derrida. Like Marcuse who was fascinated by Heidegger's concept of authenticity as, for the former, it implies the firm determination to resolve social pathologies, Derrida attempts to politicize Dasein by turning Heidegger's call for authenticity into a call for justice. For Derrida, according to Nicholas Dungey, Heidegger's notion of being-with-others reveals our inescapable responsibility to others. See Nicholas Dungey, "(Re)Turning Derrida to Heidegger", *Polity*, Vol. 33 No. 3 (Spring, 2001), 455-477. Furthermore, it is interesting to note that despite Heidegger's repudiation of politics, most of his students in the late 1920s—sometimes referred to as Heidegger's children, namely: Herbert Marcuse, Hannah Arendt, Karl Löwith, and Hans Jonas—became political philosophers; in fact, they became some of the most influential social and political philosophers in the second half of the twentieth century. For more on Heidegger and politics, see Mark Blitz, "Heidegger and the Political", *Political Theory*, Vol. 28 No. 2 (April 2000), 167-196. Hannah Arendt, for example, in her "What is Existential Philosophy?" published in 1946 sharply rejects Heidegger's thought, although she became more cautious and respectful toward Heidegger in the early 1950s. See April N. Flakne, "Beyond Banality and Fatality: Arendt, Heidegger and Jaspers on Political Speech", *New German Critique*, No. 86 (Spring-Summer, 2002), 3-18.

[38] Schoolman, *Imaginary Witness*, 12.

[39] Werner Marx, *Heidegger and Tradition*, trans. by Theodore Kisiel and Murray Greene (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1971), 163.

For Marcuse, on the contrary, the solution to inauthenticity (interpreted as reification)[40] is radical social action, that is to say, a political struggle against the dynamics of social control and domination, with and for the dominated. In other words, authenticity for Marcuse is possible if the concrete individual (Dasein) takes active part in the course of history, in changing and reshaping the pathological society.[41] As Marcuse argues, in discovering the authentic historical existence made possible by the notion of care and full knowledge of concrete historical situations (that is, as historicity), the individual becomes disposed to radical action that will finally lead to a collective radical action aimed at transforming the pathological society. It is at this precise point, regarding the sociality of Dasein, that Marcuse departs from Heidegger.[42]

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[40] See Schoolman, *Imaginary Witness*, 5.

[41] Ibid., 65.

[42] For Andrew Feenberg, however, this does not mean that Marcuse completely dropped Heidegger. He argues that Heidegger is referred to indirectly even in the later works of Marcuse. See Feenberg, *Heidegger and Marcuse*, 4.

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